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Comment
A New Tort in California: Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress (For
Married Couples Only)
by
TIMOTHY M. CAVANAUGH*
In 1968, the California Supreme Court broke new ground in decid-
ing Dillon v. Legg, 1 holding that a person need not be within the "zone of
danger" to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2 The
court relied heavily upon the concept of "foreseeability," finding it to be
the most important factor in determining liability for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. 3 Thus, the court held that a plaintiff whose emo-
tional injury was reasonably foreseeable should be entitled to recover for
the defendant's negligence. 4 To determine foreseeability, and therefore
duty and liability, in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, the
Dillon court set out a three-factor test asking whether the plaintiff was
near the scene of the accident; whether the shock resulted from a sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident; and whether the plain-
tiff and the victim were closely related. 5 As will be seen, however, courts
had a difficult time applying the Dillon factors consistently and
equitably.6
Twenty years later, the California Supreme Court decided Elden v.
Sheldon,7 declining to use the Dillon foreseeability test because of "over-
riding policy considerations." In Elden, Richard Elden and Linda
Eberling, a couple who lived together in a de facto marriage situation,
* A.B., 1985 Stanford University; Member, Third Year Class.
1. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
3. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
4. Id., 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
5. Id at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
6. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
7. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
8. Id. at 274 n.4, 758 P.2d at 586 n.4, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258 n.4 (quoting Dillon, 68 Cal.
2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79).
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were riding in a car together when they were broadsided by a truck
driven by the defendant. Eberling suffered massive injuries resulting in
her death a few hours later. Elden sued Sheldon and the owner of the
vehicle for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss
of consortium.
The Elden court denied recovery on both the negligent infliction of
emotional distress and the loss of consortium claims. The fact that the
court used policy considerations, primarily the state's interest in mar-
riage,9 to deny recovery, thus overriding the twenty year-old Dillon fac-
tors, appeared to be an acknowledgement that it had given up the
struggle to make Dillon a workable test. Then in April 1989 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court decided Thing v. La Chusa. 1o The court in La Chusa
claims to have "create[d] a clear rule under which liability may be deter-
mined" in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.""II La Chusa
sets out new set factors that allegedly refine the Dillon factors.' 2 But La
Chusa does not resolve many of the problems that have been raised by
courts dealing with negligent infliction of emotional distress in the
twenty years since Dillon. Specifically, because La Chusa affirms Elden
and its denial of recovery based upon an unfair and illogical definition of
"closely-related" persons, many deserving plaintiffs continue to be denied
recovery in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.
Because of the multitude of problems courts have had with this tort,
California may be on the road to an earlier view of negligent infliction of
emotional distress--denying recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
trauma or allowing recovery in very limited situations. In short, Elden
may have marked the beginning of the end of the Dillon era and of the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in California.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the history of the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, focusing particularly upon Cali-
fornia law, Dillon v. Legg, and Elden v. Sheldon. This Part also explores
the court's departure from previous California negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases.
Part II discusses criticisms of Dillon and post-Dillon cases. Section
A focuses on the mechanical application of the Dillon "sensory and con-
temporaneous observance" factor by post-Dillon courts that has resulted
in inconsistent and inequitable holdings. Section B discusses problems
that have arisen when courts have read a "knowledge" requirement into
the Dillon test. Section C focuses on criticisms of the foreseeability test
and queries whether foreseeability is an accurate measure of liability in
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. This section analyzes
9. Id. at 274-75, 758 P.2d at 586-87, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59.
10. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
11. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 927, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
12. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
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how the concept of foreseeability should be used in determining liability
in tort law and, in particular, how it pertains to negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases.
Section A of Part III focuses on Elden's departure from Dillon and
how it represents a turnaround by the California Supreme Court in deal-
ing with negligent infliction of emotional distress. Section A also dis-
cusses and critiques the reasons given by the Elden court to justify
overriding the Dillon factors and the attempt in La Chusa to refine those
factors. Section B of Part III considers policy reasons regarding foresee-
ability and the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. This dis-
cussion then focuses on how these policy justifications are unfulfilled by
the Elden holding and speculates as to the "real" reasons behind the
court's holding. Finally, this section posits a more logical rationale by
which the Elden court could have attained its objectives. In conclusion,
the Comment discusses what Elden signals for the future of the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
I. Recovery for Emotional Distress: A Brief History
This section presents a brief history of recovery in emotional dis-
tress, focusing particularly on California law. The discussion begins with
the common law, when no recovery was allowed for mental distress, and
follows the development of recognition of a cause of action for recovery
in emotional distress cases through the "physical impact" and "zone of
danger" rules, leading up to Dillon v. Legg, which laid out a set of factors
to be considered in determining liability in negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cases.
A. From Common Law to Dillon v. Legg
To fully appreciate the distinctions between Dillon v. Legg 13 and
Elden v. Sheldon, 14 it is helpful to understand the history and develop-
ment of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Common
law denied recovery for emotional trauma.1 5 Several arguments were
used to justify this denial of a cause of action for emotional distress.
First, because mental distress cannot be quantified like other types of
injury to property or "physical" bodily harm, it was thought that the
lack of a basis for a cause of action would result in falsified claims.1 6
Second, common-law courts saw emotional distress as too remote from
13. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
14. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr 254 (1988).
15. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel, & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 319, 379 P.2d 513, 527-28,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 47-48 (1963) (Peters, J., dissenting).
16. See, eg., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 109-10, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55
(1896); Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
the negligent defendant's act and not proximately caused 17 by the de-
fendant's negligence. 18 Thus, even though a defendant may have been
negligent, she would not be held responsible for the emotional distress
resulting from her conduct. 19 Third, courts denied recovery for emo-
tional distress because they lacked precedent for recognizing a cause of
action for such harm20 and because they thought that recognition of such
a claim would increase litigation greatly.21
Various commentators and judges began to speak up in favor of re-
covery for emotional distress. These advocates pointed out that mental
suffering was no more difficult to determine and quantify than "physical"
pain.2 2 They also argued that emotional distress was not an independent
intervening cause and thus should be compensated.2 3 In addition, these
commentators advocated that courts should make precedent when a
wrong calls for redress, even if more litigation would result.24
Courts gradually accepted these views, but they imposed restrictions
on emotional distress claims. The first recovery for emotional distress
was found only as an aggravation of damages sought under intentional
tort theories; emotional distress did not, by itself, create a cause of ac-
tion.2 5 Eventually, courts began to focus on the defendant's conduct and
not on the nature of the injury to recognize what is now called the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.26 In California, one of the
first cases allowing recovery for emotional distress as an independent tort
stated that "[i]n cases where mental suffering constitutes a major element
of damages it is anomalous to deny recovery because the defendant's in-
17. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 16, 73 A. 4, 5 (1909);
Mitchell, 151 N.Y at 110, 45 N.E. at 355; Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas.
222 (1888).
19. See, e.g., Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354 ("assuming that.., the defendant
... was negligent.., we think the ... cases, as well as public policy, fully justify us in holding
that the plaintiff cannot recover").
20. Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 355, 356 (1888); Victorian, 13
App. Cas. at 225.
21. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Mitch-
ell, 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
22. See, e.g., Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497,
503 (1922).
23. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 138, 50 N.W. 1034, 1035 (1892);
Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 195-99, 66 A. 202, 206-08 (1907).
24. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 321, 73 So. 205, 207-08
(1916); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 333-35, 150 A. 540, 542-
43 (1930).
25. B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 402, at 483 (9th ed. 1988).
26. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 606-07 (2d ed. 1986) (foot-
notes omitted).
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tentional misconduct fell short of producing some physical injury." 27
Thus, intentional infliction of emotional distress became an independent
tort.
By this time California courts also had developed a line of cases
recognizing recovery for negligently inflicted mental trauma. These
cases, however, limited recovery to persons who were physically injured
and whose emotional distress was parasitic to that injury, or to those who
were not physically injured from the impact, but who suffered physical
injury as a result of the mental distress. 28 Courts eventually developed
the "physical impact" rule, allowing recovery in negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases when there was physical impact, whether or not
the impact resulted in physical injury.29 Later cases replaced the "physi-
cal impact rule" with the "zone of danger rule," which allowed compen-
sation to plaintiffs in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases who
were within the zone of physical danger, without the need for any physi-
cal impact.30
In California, Dillon v. Legg31 took the first step beyond the physical
impact rule. A discussion of Dillon should begin with the case that it
overruled, namely Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 32 After con-
firming that physical impact was not necessary for recovery in a negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress case in California, the Amaya court
held that the plaintiff must be in the zone of danger and must fear for her
own safety as a result of defendant's conduct in order to recover for emo-
tional harm. 33 In Amaya, a mother observed the defendant's truck strike
and kill her infant son. The mother alleged that she had suffered emo-
tional distress, not because she had feared for her own safety, but because
she had witnessed the death of her son. Because the mother had not
alleged fear for her own life as a basis for her negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim, that is, she was not within the zone of danger, the
California Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide whether the de-
fendant could be held liable without this factor. The court refused to
hold the defendant liable,3 4 citing among other reasons, "administrative
and socioeconomic factors."35 The court was concerned with the diffi-
culties inherent in determining liability in negligent infliction of emo-
27. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznof, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952).
28. See Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 184, 4 P.2d 532, 533 (1931);
Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 301-02, 176 P. 440, 441 (1918).
29. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 331 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Tubin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969).
31. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (968).
32. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
33. 59 Cal. 2d at 305-06, 379 P.2d at 519, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
34. Id. at 315, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
35. Id. at 310-15, 379 P.2d at 523-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42-45.
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tional distress cases without the consistency that comes with the a bright-
line rule.36 Specifically, the court expressed its concern about the diffi-
culty of proving and quantifying emotional harm. 37
As to the "socioeconomic factors," in reaffirming the zone of danger
rule, the court cited the negative effects on economic growth and the
insurance industry that would result if liability were found where the
plaintiffs themselves were not actually in physical danger. The court
asked: "[C]ould [the insurance] system -imperfect at best-adequately
and fairly absorb the far-reaching extension of liability that would follow
from judicial abrogation of the [zone of danger rule] ... ?"38 Appar-
ently, the court believed the answer to this question was no.
Five years later the court decided Dillon v. Legg. 39 In Dillon, a
young girl within the "zone of danger" witnessed the death of her sister
caused by the defendant's negligence. The mother of the two girls wit-
nessed the same event from a few feet away. Because the mother was
outside the "zone of danger," she would not have been able to recover for
her emotional distress under then-existing California law.
Dillon thus presented a fact pattern illustrating the arbitrary nature
of negligent infliction of emotional distress law at the time: that the dif-
ference of a few feet could determine compensation for emotional dis-
tress. The fact that the daughter feared for her own safety while the
mother did not was irrelevant to the degree of emotional distress suffered
by either party. Arguably, the mother's emotional distress may have
been greater than her daughter's because the mother was forced to watch
as both of her daughters nearly were killed as a result of the defendant's
negligence. The Dillon court took this opportunity to reassess the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress in California and, in overruling
Amaya, threw out the policy reasons and rationales from earlier cases.
The court set out the following three factors to evaluate liability in negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress cases:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the
shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as con-
trasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 40
36. Id. at 313, 379 P.2d at 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
37. Id. at 311-12, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
38. Id. at 314, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
39. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
40. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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The Dillon court focused on the foreseeability of the risk.41 The
court believed that the three factors represented a test for foreseeability,
and thus reasonably measured the defendant's liability. The Dillon opin-
ion indicates that these three factors are guidelines and are not to be
strictly applied.42 In this context, the court warned that in future cases
courts would need to determine a defendant's liability on a case-by-case
basis.43
The Dillon court rejected the argument that to allow mere bystand-
ers to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress would greatly
increase litigation of "fraudulent" and "inadequate" claims, 44 stating
that the requirement of foreseeability would limit the defendant's duty
and liability. The court reasoned that foreseeability limits liability be-
cause persons would be held responsible only for situations in which it
was reasonably foreseeable that their negligent acts would cause emo-
tional distress. 45
Although the Dillon court laid down a fairly specific test for future
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, the factors themselves
proved to be difficult to apply, as is evidenced by the lower courts' varied
and often inconsistent applications of the test.46
B. Elden v. Sheldon
Elden v. Sheldon47 is a landmark case in the history of negligent
infliction of emotional distress in California. Without specifically over-
ruling Dillon, the California Supreme Court virtually abandoned the Dil-
lon criteria in deciding a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
The facts of Elden were undisputed. The plaintiff, Richard Elden,
and Linda Eberling, his live-in lover, were involved in an automobile ac-
cident allegedly caused by defendant Richard Sheldon's negligence.48
The plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Eberling was thrown from the
car and died a few hours later.49 The defendants (Sheldon and the owner
of the vehicle Sheldon was driving) demurred to the causes of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. 50 The
41. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
42. Id., 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
43. Id., 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. Whether the factors actually do test
for foreseeability is questionable, see supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
44. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 736-39, 441 P.2d at 917-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-79.
45. The Dillon court did, however, retain the need for a physical manifestation of the
emotional distress. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 72-88.
47. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
48. Id. at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
49. Id., 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55.
50. Id., 758 P.2d at 583, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a
judgment of dismissal, and the plaintiff appealed. 51
The California Supreme Court's discussion focused particularly
upon Dillon v. Legg 52 and its effect upon the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress in California. 53 According to Elden, although the Dil-
lon test used foreseeability of the risk as determinative of whether the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the test also "recognize[d] that
policy considerations may dictate a cause of action should not be sanc-
tioned no matter how foreseeable the risk."'54 Elden claimed this propo-
sition to be "self-evident," because "the consequences of a negligent act
must be limited to avoid an intolerable burden on society." 55
The Elden court found three policy reasons to justify rejecting plain-
tiff's claim for emotional distress. First, the court stated that "the state
has a strong interest in the marriage relationship; to the extent unmarried
cohabitants are granted the same rights as married persons, the state's
interest in promoting marriage is inhibited."' 56 The court also cited an
interest in judicial efficiency, stating that "the allowance of a cause of
action in the circumstances of this case could impose a difficult burden
on the courts."' 57 Finally, the court stated that "the need to limit the
number of persons to whom a negligent defendant owes a duty of care" 58
also justified denial of the plaintiff's emotional distress claim.
Regarding the state's interest in the marriage relationship, the court
pointed out that married couples are granted certain rights and bear cer-
tain responsibilities that unmarried couples do not share. As an example,
the court referred to statutes governing "the requirements for the entry
into and termination of marriage and the property rights which flow
from that relationship, and the law imposes various obligations on
spouses, such as the duty of support." 59 The court emphasized that the
state's policy favoring marriage "is not based on anachronistic notions of
morality ... [but instead] is 'rooted in the necessity of providing an insti-
tutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsi-
bilities of persons in organized society.' ",60
The majority also said that recognizing a cause of action for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress in this case would burden the courts
51. Id., 758 P.2d at 583, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
52. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
53. 46 Cal. 3d at 269-74, 758 P.2d at 583-86, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255-58.
54. Id. at 274, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
55. Id., 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
56. Id., 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
57. Id. at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
58. Id. at 276, 758 P.2d at 587-88, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
59. Id. at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (citations omitted).
60. Id., 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (quoting Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339,
341 (Iowa 1983)).
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because "[it would require a court to inquire into the relationship of the
partners to determine whether the 'emotional attachments of the family
relationship' existed between the parties, and whether the relationship
was 'stable and significant.' ",61 The Elden court claimed that such an
inquiry would be "a massive intrusion" into the litigants' private lives
and would lead to inconsistent applications in future cases. 62
On the third rationale, the need to limit the number of plaintiffs to
whom a negligent person owes a duty of care, the court cited Dean Pros-
ser, saying that " '[i]t would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all
human activity if the defendant who has endangered one man were to be
compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person dis-
turbed by reason of it.' ",63
As the sole dissenter, Justice Broussard stated that the court had
chosen a bright-line rule that the majority admitted had "no relationship
to the nature or foreseeability of the plaintiff's injury, factors usually
considered important in defining the perimeters of tort liability." 64 The
dissent also observed that "[t]he convenience and certainty of a foolproof
bright line is not sufficient to justify denying recovery to an entire class of
deserving plaintiffs on the arbitrary ground of marital status."'65
Justice Broussard took issue with each of the majority's factors and
found them lacking in both logic and precedent.66 He dismissed the
"state's interest in marriage" justification, finding it "difficult to fathom
how granting relief to a person who is already injured, regardless of mari-
tal status, will detract from society's interest in marriage. ' 67 He admit-
ted that the state has an interest in the institution of marriage, but that it
does not "imply a corresponding policy against non-marital
relationships. 68
Justice Broussard also stated that the "burden on the courts" ration-
ale had been brought up before and soundly rejected in past cases, in-
cluding Dillon.69  Although finding the "limitation of liability"
61. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (quoting Butcher v.
Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 512 (1983); Mobaldi v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726 (1976)).
62. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 276, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
63. Id. at 276, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal.Rptr. at 260 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 55, at 353-54 (3d ed. 1964)).
64. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 280, 758 P.2d at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262. (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id., 758 P.2d at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 281-84, 758 P.2d at 591-93, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263-66 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 281, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
68. Id., 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing Norman
v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 14, 663 P.2d 904, 912, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134,
142 (1983)).
69. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 282-83, 758 P.2d at 592, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
justification reasonable, Justice Broussard described the majority's
bright-line rule as "crude" and "arbitrary," and not based upon "func-
tional grounds that correspond with real loss."
70
II. Criticisms of Dillon v. Legg
There has been much criticism of Dillon v. Legg71 in the past twenty
years. Some of this commentary has come about because application of
the "sensory and contemporaneous observance" factor has brought in-
consistent results. These criticisms are discussed in section A below.
Section B discusses another line of criticism focusing on the problems
resulting from the "knowledge" requirement read into the Dillon factors
by some courts. Section C examines criticisms of the foreseeability test
as an indicator of liability in negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases.
A. The Sensory and Contemporaneous Observance Requirement
The Dillon factors appear to reflect accurately what a court should
consider when deciding who may and who may not recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The lower courts, however, have exper-
ienced difficulty in applying the factors to differing factual situations, re-
sulting in confusion and inconsistency.
Consequently, there have been many problems with the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress in the twenty years since Dillon.
Though there has been little misinterpretation of the first factor in Dillon,
requiring that the plaintiff be near the scene of the accident, the other
two factors, requiring the plaintiff to have had a "close relationship" to
the victim and "sensory and contemporaneous observance" of the acci-
dent, have proven difficult for courts to apply. Part of the problem is
that, despite the caution in the Dillon opinion that the factors are merely
guidelines, 72 courts have applied the Dillon factors inflexibly, resulting in
conflicting and inequitable decisions.
When applying the sensory and contemporaneous observance re-
quirement, the difference between a plaintiff who recovers and one who
does not has often been based upon arbitrary factors such as whether the
plaintiff actually witnessed the defendant's negligent conduct, or instead
70. Id. at 284, 758 P.2d at 593, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
71. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Many scholars have attempted
to reconcile the inconsistent rulings since Dillon. See, e.g., Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward a Full
Recovery For Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984); Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revis-
ited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Inju-
ries, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Coherence Emerging From Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982); RABIN, Tort Recovery for
Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).
72. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
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observed the results of the negligence a few moments later. For example,
in Hathaway v. Superior Court,73 the plaintiff's son, Michael, electro-
cuted himself by touching an electrically-charged water cooler while
playing just outside his home. The boy's mother, who was inside the
house, heard him make a noise, but "it did not alarm her."' 74 When noti-
fied by Michael's friend that something was wrong, however, Mrs.
Hathaway and her husband went outside and saw Michael lying by the
cooler in a "dying state."' 75 Because the child no longer actually was
receiving the electrical charge, the court of appeal held that the parents
had not "sensorily perceive[d] the injury-causing event" 76 and thus did
not meet the second Dillon requirement of a "sensory and contemporane-
ous observance of the accident."'77
Hathaway is at odds with an earlier case, Nazaroff v. Superior
Court. 78 In Nazaroff, the court of appeal allowed recovery to a mother
who watched her drowned son being dragged from a neighbor's pool.
Though the mother did not witness the actual drowning, as the
Hathaways did not witness their son being electrocuted, the Hathaway
court distinguished Nazaroff, saying that in Nazaroff the child still could
have been in the process of drowning, so the mother actually could have
observed the accident. 79
Great inequities result when cases such as Hathaway strictly and
unreasonably apply the sensory and contemporaneous observance factor
from Dillon. The language in Dillon does not require that the plaintiff
actually see the harm-causing event. It requires a "direct emotional im-
pact.., from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the acci-
dent," °80 not an emotional impact from a direct visual observance of the
accident itself. The emotional impact must be a direct result of the acci-
dent, not a result of having observed the accident directly.
This reading of the second Dillon factor is supported by the lan-
guage following, and limiting, the above-quoted language: the shock
must result from a "direct emotional impact ... from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident as contrasted with learning
of the accident from others after its occurrence. ",8' This language suggests
that Dillon established a continuum. At one end of the spectrum is the
person who is at the scene, is directly involved in the accident, actually
73. 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980).
74. Id. at 730, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
75. Id. at 731, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
76. Id. at 736, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
77. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80
(1968).
78. 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
79. Id. at 566-67, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
80. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (emphasis added).
sees the injury-causing event, and is personally injured as a result of the
event itself. This person clearly falls within the sensory and contempora-
neous observance factor in Dillon. At the other end of the spectrum is
the person who is remote in both distance and time from the injury- caus-
ing event and who learns of the accident by means other than his or her
own personal experience of the event. This person clearly would not re-
cover under the observance factor in Dillon.
Hathaway and most other hard cases are somewhere between these
two extremes. In these types of cases, the courts should determine the
spirit behind Dillon and apply the test accordingly. When analyzed in
this way, the facts in Hathaway are much closer to the "recovery" end of
the spectrum than they are to the "remote, non-recovery" end. The par-
ents in Hathaway watched their son die after he had been electrocuted as
a result of the defendant's negligence. It is extremely harsh to deny re-
covery in situations such as this.
The Dillon court intended to allow recovery for nearly everyone
who sensorily and contemporaneously observes a negligently caused
event that causes emotional harm, assuming, of course, satisfaction of the
other two factors. This group of persons includes those who view the
scene after the actual negligent act has occurred, but at a time when it is
still clear, from observing the victim and the scene of the accident, what
actually has taken place. This reading of Dillon is more in line with the
intent underlying the decision than the strict mechanical applications
that have been used by the California courts. Under this reading, per-
sons who suffer emotional harm as a result of observing the results of
defendant's negligence are allowed to recover.
B. The "Knowledge" Requirement
Other cases illustrate another problem created as a result of strict,
mechanical application of the sensory and contemporaneous factor. This
problem arises when courts read a "knowledge" requirement into the
sensory and contemporaneous factor. Under this requirement, the plain-
tiff cannot recover for emotional distress unless she suffered great emo-
tional distress from observing the results of the defendant's negligence
and also knew at the time of this observation that the defendant's negli-
gence had harmed the victim.
In Cortez v. Macias, 82 for example, a mother saw her son die in a
hospital. The fact that the death was a result of the hospital's negligence
was unknown to the mother at the time; she thought that her child had
fallen asleep.8 3 The court held that since she lacked this knowledge when
she witnessed the distress-causing event, she could not be compensated
82. 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980).
83. Id. at 650, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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for her emotional distress. 84 The court came to this conclusion despite
the presence of the other elements of the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress: the hospital was negligent, the hospital's negligence
caused the child's death, and the mother suffered emotional distress as a
direct result of having observed her child's death.
Yet, in Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California, 85 which was
factually similar to Cortez, the plaintiff was found to have satisfied the
"sensory and contemporaneous observance" factor from Dillon.86 The
plaintiff in Mobaldi, a foster mother, witnessed her foster child convulse
and eventually become comatose after having been injected with a fifty
percent glucose solution instead of the prescribed five percent. The
mother did not know at the time that the defendant's negligence caused
the child's reactions, and yet she was allowed to recover for her emo-
tional distress.87 The Mobaldi court reasoned that since observing the
consequences of the negligent act caused the trauma, not the negligent
act itself, "there is no significance in the plaintiff's lack of awareness that
the defendant's conduct ... is negligent. ' 88 The findings were different
in each case even though both plaintiffs were unaware that the defend-
ants' negligence had caused the harm and both plaintiffs suffered emo-
tional distress.
These cases are inequitable because one plaintiff recovered while the
other did not. These conflicting results are especially disturbing given
Dillon's emphasis on the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff being a
primary indicator of liability; and in Cortez the plaintiff's harm was ar-
guably as foreseeable as in Mobaldi.
C. The Foreseeability Test
A discussion of foreseeability is important because of the California
Supreme Court's disparate use of the concept in determining liability in
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. In Dillon, the court stated
that, "the law of torts holds defendants amenable only for injuries to
others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable." 8 9 In
Elden, however, the court found that "policy considerations ... dictate[d
that] a cause of action should not be sanctioned no matter how foresee-
able the risk." 90 This discussion analyzes foreseeability in an attempt to
84. Id., 167 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
85. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
86. Id. at 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441
P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968)).
87. Id. at 578, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
88. Id. at 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
89. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 782, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968).
90. Elden v. Sheldon, 467 Cal. 3d 267, 274, 758 P.2d 582, 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 258
(1988).
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find its proper place in determining liability in negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cases.
Generally, the defendant is liable for all injuries that he proximately
causes. 91 Proximate cause is a doctrine that limits liability. Even when a
defendent is the actual cause of the plaintiff's harm, he may not be held
liable for the injury because the injury caused was not a reasonably fore-
seeable result-it was not the "legal," or proximate cause. 92
The defendant is not responsible for consequences that are too re-
mote from his conduct 93 and is liable for only those consequences that
reasonably can be anticipated or foreseen. 94 Thus, the concept of foresee-
ability defines whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff and
helps courts to determine whether the injury was proximately caused by
the defendant's negligent act. 95
"Foresee" generally means "to see beforehand; know beforehand;
foreknow."'96 This definition indicates a subjective standard: what a spe-
cific person saw or knew beforehand. But in law, foreseeability has come
to be an objective standard: what the "reasonable person" would fore-
see. 97 The reasons the law uses an objective standard are clear.98 One
reason is the difficulty of proving what went on in [a] person's head. 99
Second, an objective standard is used because of the general need in soci-
ety to establish reasonable standards of conduct.'0°
There are problems, however, with the use of an objective standard
when discussing foreseeability. Under this standard, liability is based
upon how a "reasonable person" would act. "o' Using the reasonable per-
son standard, a person may be accountable for his actions, though he was
91. W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS §§ 41-45 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
92. B. WITKIN, supra note 25, § 968. Black's Law Dictionary defines the proximate
cause of an injury as:
[T]he primary or moving cause, or that which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which
the accident could not have happened, if the injury be one which might be reasonably
anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of the wrongful act.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (5th ed. 1979)
93. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99, 101
(1928) (finding no duty to the plaintiff because the harm done was completely unforeseeable).
94. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91.
95. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 91, § 43.
96. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 546 (2d ed. 1980).
97. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 31.
98. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 32.
99. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 32, at 177.
100. See id.
101. The "reasonable person" standard is one that is used throughout tort law. Various
definitions of the "reasonable person" have been posited. In Vaughan v. Menlove, Eng. Rep.
490, 493 (1837), Chief Justice Tindal said the standard should be "a regard to caution such as
a man of ordinary prudence would observe." The reasonable man has also been described as
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not actually aware of the potential results of those actions, if a "reason-
able person" would have been aware of the consequences. This rule
seems to punish persons who have done nothing wrong. But in a legal
context, foreseeability is used as a directive as to how the law believes
people should act in a well-ordered society. This aspect of foreseeability
allows the legal system to assign responsibility to certain persons for
damage caused as a result of their crossing the line of "proper" behavior.
The concept of fault is, of course, implicit within the law's choice in
using foreseeability to determine liability in negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cases. It would be fundamentally unfair to hold people
responsible for injuries that were not their fault. Fault also encompasses
the idea of moral blame, implying that a choice exists. If no socially
permissible choice exists, as in the defenses of necessity or duress, for
example, there is no liability because there has been no "fault." 10 2 Thus,
in a sense, the law says that someone is at fault if they make the incorrect
choice-the choice that the "reasonable person" would not have made
because she would have foreseen that the incorrect choice could have
harmful consequences.
But exactly what one is expected to foresee is troublesome because it
seems possible to foresee almost anything. The law, however, limits what
one is required to foresee: a defendant is liable if a reasonable person
would have avoided the foreseeable harm. 103 A reasonable person would
act to avoid foreseeable harm after determining that the costs of a certain
course of action outweigh the benefits. 104 Clearly, the concept of foresee-
ability in tort law has been established by the courts to indicate where to
draw the line between liable and nonliable conduct. Thus, to say that the
defendant does not owe a duty to an injured plaintiff because the out-
come was not foreseeable is to say that it would have been unreasonable
to require someone to take into account the possibility of that type of
injury occurring.
In sum, foreseeability in tort law has become a term of art having
less to do with describing the imaginable consequences of people's ac-
tions than with limiting conduct for which society will hold its members
responsible. Courts have deemed that liability for every imaginable con-
sequence of people's actions is bad policy because other factors such as
economics and general practicality should be taken into account.10 5 As a
result, the definition of foreseeability in tort law has been limited and
defined to the point where it has lost its effectiveness as a dispositive
"the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawn mower in his
shirt sleeves." Hall v. Brooklands Club, 1 K.B. 205, 224 (1933).
102. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 24.
103. B. WITKIN, supra note 25, § 751.
104. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 31.
105. See id.
indicator of liability.' 0 6 Nonetheless, even though "foreseeability" may
have become a conclusory term and not a tool used to validate policy
considerations to determine liability, this development does not render
the concept necessarily unworkable or one that should be thrown out
completely, as the Elden court appears to have done. Foreseeability still
should be used as a factor when a court is deciding whether to hold a
defendant liable for the emotional distress she causes. But as the Califor-
nia Supreme Court recently recognized in La Chusa, it should be just one
factor and not the deciding factor in determining whether liability
exists. 107
III. Elden v. Sheldon: A New Approach
The California Supreme Court broke new ground in the area of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress in Elden v. Sheldon. 108 The court
appeared to realize the shortcomings of using "foreseeability" as the pri-
mary indicator of liability in negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims and declined to use the Dillon v. Legg 10 9 foreseeability test.
In not following Dillon, the Elden court used an analytic approach
that is more similar to pre-Dillon cases such as Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel
& Supply Co. 110 than to anything since Dillon.' For example, Elden did
not use a specific test or set of guidelines in determining liability, but
instead found policy reasons to justify its result. 112 There are also differ-
ences between Elden and pre-Dillon cases, however. One distinction is
that although the Elden court explicitly used policy reasons to override
the use of foreseeability as the litmus test for liability," 1 3 the court did not
adequately justify its result. The connection between the policy reasons
stated and the court's holding, as Justice Broussard pointed out in his
dissent," 4 goes against common sense and prior case law.
The first section of Part III discusses how the court's analysis in
Elden changed Dillon, and how this change represents a new approach to
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases in California. This change
is demonstrated by analyzing Elden under a traditional Dillon analysis-
106. The La Chusa court acknowledged this fact in stating that "it is clear that foreseeabil-
ity of the injury alone is not a useful 'guideline' or a meaningful restriction on the scope of the
negligent infliction of emotional distress action." Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 663, 771
P.2d 814, 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 877 (1989).
107. Id., 771 P.2d at 826-27, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
108. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
109. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1960).
110. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), See supra text accompanying
notes 32-38.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 72-88.
112. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 274, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
113. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
114. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 281, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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and seeing that the plaintiff would have been allowed recovery for his
emotional distress if the Elden court had followed Dillon. Section A then
discusses the reasons given in the Elden opinion for this change in analy-
sis-and the inadequacies of these reasons. The section concludes with a
discussion of Thing v. La Chusa,II5 its attempt to refine the Dillon fac-
tors, and the inadequacy of these factors in defining the close-relationship
requirement.
Section B of Part III begins with a general discussion of the role of
policy rationales regarding foreseeability and, particularly, the policy
reasons behind having a tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
at all. This discussion then focuses on how the original reasons for hav-
ing a tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress have not been fur-
thered by Elden. Part III then discusses what might be some of the
"real" policy reasons for Elden's break with twenty years of case prece-
dent in California-and posits what would have been better ways to at-
tain those policy objectives.
A. A Departure from Dillon
Elden did not expressly overrule Dillon but it is clear that in Elden
the California Supreme Court strayed from the course of twenty years of
negligent infliction of emotional distress case law. This movement away
from Dillon is exemplified most clearly by subjecting the facts of Elden to
a traditional Dillon analysis.
The Elden court never attempted to analyze the facts before it under
the Dillon test. Perhaps it did not do so because, if it had, the plaintiff
clearly would have recovered for his emotional distress. As I believe the
Elden court implied,116 the relationship between the plaintiff and the vic-
tim was sufficiently close to satisfy the first prong of the Dillon test. 1 7
As to the other two factors, there is little doubt that the facts of Elden
would have fulfilled those requirements as well: the plaintiff was "located
near the scene of the accident" since he was in the car with the victim
when the accident occurred, and his emotional injury apparently "re-
sulted from sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident."" 18
The facts of Elden therefore establish a prima facie case for recovery
under Dillon. In order for the Elden court; to deny recovery, it could not
use the Dillon test. The court avoided the Dillon analysis by finding pol-
115. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
116. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 273, 758 P.2d at 585-86, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58. I infer this
because of the fact that the court did not take issue with the finding of the trial court that the
plaintiff and Eberling had a de facto marriage. Id. at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
254.
117. Id., 758 P.2d at 585-86, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58.
118. Dillon v. Legg 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41,441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
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icy justifications that it believed sufficiently warranted the dismissal of
the Dillon factors.
The three-factor test laid out in Dillon focused on determining the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. The Dillon court qualified its test,
however, when it stated that, "[ijn the absence of 'overriding policy con-
siderations . ..foreseeability of risk [is] of . . .primary importance in
establishing the element of duty." ' 19 Yet, the Elden court granted far
more weight to this potential overriding effect of policy considerations
than appears warranted under Dillon. As the third Dillon factor is
"[w]hether plaintiff and the victim were closely related,"' 20 it is simply
inconsistent with Dillon to base a policy overriding this factor upon the
relationship between the plaintiff and the victim, unless the two were not
closely related, which was not the case in Elden.
The plaintiff and the victim were closely involved, 12 1 especially "as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a
distant relationship,"1 22 as was the distinction made in Dillon. If a policy
consideration were to override the "closely-related" factor, it should not
be a policy favoring one type of close relationship over another. If Dillon
had intended to limit the tort to legally sanctioned relationships, it might
have explicitly stated so. The lack of such a limitation suggests that the
Dillon court preferred a more flexible analysis, perhaps realizing that
many persons, in many different types of relationships, would suffer emo-
tional distress upon witnessing the injury or death of their loved ones-
not only those persons who are legally married. Elden ignored this sensi-
ble and intuitive idea. Even La Chusa acknowledged that "limiting re-
covery to persons closely related by blood or marriage [was] indisputably
arbitrary," although attempting to justify this illogical result by claiming
that "drawing arbitrary lines is unavoidable."' 123
Previous decisions recognized Dillon's emphasis on the substance of
a relationship over its legal form. As the court of appeals stated in
Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California: 124
The 'close relationship' element of Dillon is expressed as one test of
foreseeability that negligent infliction of injury upon one person will
cause emotional distress and consequent physical harm to another.
The emotional attachments of the family relationship and not the legal
status are those which are relevant to foreseeability .... The public
policy limitation on loss shifting inherent in the Dillon v. Legg guide-
119. 68 Cal. 2d at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (quoting Grafton v. Mollica,
231 Cal. App. 2d 860, 865, 42 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 (1965)) (emphasis added).
120. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
121. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
122. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal Rptr. at 80.
123. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 666, 771 P.2d 814, 824, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 879
(1989).
124. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
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lines seemingly does not limit the close relationship requirement to one
of blood, marriage, or adoption. 125
Following the Mobaldi court's interpretation of the "close relation-
ship" element, Elden clearly violates the spirit and intent of Dillon by
limiting the close relationship requirement to one that is legally recog-
nized, such as marriage.
Elden also represents a departure from well-established principles of
existing case law. The California Supreme Court has rejected two of the
three policy reasons set forth in Elden to justify denying liability on sev-
eral previous occasions: that allowing the plaintiff recovery in this case
will "impose a difficult burden on the courts," 1 2 6 and that "the need to
limit the number of persons to whom a negligent defendant owes a duty
of care."' 127
Referring to the "burden on the courts" rationale, Justice Broussard
stated in his dissent, "this court - including the author of the majority
opinion - has soundly rejected the argument that compensation should
be denied to all plaintiffs because of the difficulty of determining which
plaintiffs are deserving and how much they deserve."'' 28 Broussard con-
tinued: "Assessing the stability and significance of a relationship is cer-
tainly no more burdensome than quantifying subjective and intangible
emotional loss, and we should have confidence in the ability of the fact
finder to 'separate wheat from chaff.' 129 Thus, Justice Broussard ar-
gued that the difficulty of the factfinder's task does not justify denial of
the plaintiff's claim for relief.
The Elden court also cited "the need to limit the number of persons
to whom a negligent defendant owes a duty of care"' 30 to justify denying
recovery to the plaintiff. Clearly, a defendant should not be held liable
for every consequence of his actions; a line must be drawn between liable
conduct and actions resulting in consequences too remote to warrant lia-
bility. Drawing the line at marriage, however, is neither fair nor logical.
Justice Broussard, in his Elden dissent, cited Dillon itself to support this
position:
As the commentators have suggested, the problem should be solved by
the application of the principles of tort, not by the creation of excep-
tions to them. Legal history shows that artificial islands of exceptions,
125. Id. at 582, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
126. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 275, 758 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259
(1988).
127. Id. at 276, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal Rptr. at 260.
128. Id. at 282, 758 P.2d at 592, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citing Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 401-04, 525 P.2d 669, 681-83, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776-79 (1979);
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 742-43, 441 P.2d 912, 921-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81-82 (1968)
(Broussard J., dissenting)).
129. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 283, 758 P.2d at 593, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting) (citing Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (D.N.J. 1980)).
130. Id. at 276, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
created from the fear that the legal process will not work, usually do
not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into
oblivion. 13
1
An analysis under Thing v. La Chusa, 132 decided just eight months
after Elden, does not, unfortunately, change the outcome under the
Elden scenario. La Chusa sets out a new three-factor test allowing recov-
ery for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the plaintiff:
(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then, aware that
it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious
emotional distress.1 33
Though application of the La Chusa test in future cases will inevita-
bly help to resolve some of the inconsistencies presented in the post-Dil-
lon cases discussed above, it will do so on unjust and arbitrary grounds.
In a footnote to the first prong of the La Chusa test, the court states
that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, recovery should be limited to
relatives residing in the same household, or parents, siblings, children,
and grandparents of the victim. 1 34 La Chusa thus affirms the unjust
holding of Elden-permitting "the sometimes arbitrary result" of not al-
lowing recovery to unmarried cohabitants in negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cases, despite the closeness of the relationship. 35 The
"absent exceptional circumstances" qualification presents an opportunity
for lower courts to grant recovery in future Elden-type situations. But
even this chance is doubtful because it is clear from the holding in Elden
itself that exceptional circumstances do not contemplate unmarried
couples. Accordingly, the La Chusa court later states that "[n]o policy
supports extension of the right to recover for [negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress] to a larger class of plaintiffs."1 36 Simple logic and fairness
justify extending recovery to persons beyond those arbitrarily defined by
both Elden and La Chusa. The factfinder would have no more difficulty
in determining a sufficiently close relationship any more than in deter-
mining many other findings of fact.
B. Policy Justifications
Elden is not the first case to deny recovery on the basis of policy
considerations. Courts always have limited the scope of foreseeability,
citing policy reasons as a justification. 137 In negligent infliction of emo-
131. Id. at 284, 758 P.2d at 593, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 747, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968)).
132. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
133. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
134. Id. at 668 n.10, 771 P.2d at 829 n.10, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.10.
135. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
136. Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
137. See, e.g., id. at 654, 771 P.2d at 820, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 87 n.3 (the "court's role in
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tional distress cases, the policy justifications that courts have found to
deny recovery include
the burden on the courts applying 'vaguely defined criteria[,] .. .the
importance of limiting the scope of liability[,] ... the importance of
clear guidelines under which litigants and trial courts may resolve dis-
putes[,] ... the social cost of imposing liability.., for all foreseeable
emotional distress suffered by relatives who witnessed the injury[,]...
the intangible nature of the loss, the inadequacy of monetary damages
to make whole the loss, the difficulty in measuring the damage and the
societal cost of attempting to compensate the plaintiff.138
The Elden court appeared to rely on the first two of these rationales in
finding no liability because it reasoned that unmarried people do not con-
stitute the close relationship contemplated by the Dillon guidelines re-
gardless of the closeness of their relationship, the foreseeability of the
harm they suffer, or the severity of the harm that is caused them. Yet,
this position is at odds with the reasons for having a tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress in the first place.
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in California
allows recovery to someone, for example a mother, for the emotional
distress she suffers when a tortfeasor negligently causes injury to some-
one emotionally close enough to the mother, such as her child, to cause
her emotional distress. 139 It is difficult to see how limiting recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress to legally-sanctioned relation-
ships in any way furthers this intent. Quite simply, it does not. The
marriage factor is an artificial wall constructed by the court to mechani-
cally redefine the tort, the inevitable result of which will be to deny re-
covery to deserving plaintiffs for their emotional distress.
There are several possible reasons why the court chose to stray from
the path it had laid out in Dillon. First, the court may have been at-
tempting to limit strictly the Dillon holding because of the problems
courts have had interpreting it in the past twenty years. 14° A second
explanation for the Elden holding is that the court may have feared that
if it allowed recovery, it would have a very difficult time not allowing
recovery in future cases involving gay and lesbian couples under similar
circumstances-something that the conservative court probably would
not be willing to do. Finally, the court in Elden may have chosen to take
a first step toward eliminating the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress altogether, a task the court furthered by its holding in La Chusa.
deciding whether a duty to ... persons should be recognized does not depend solely on the
'foreseeability' of the emotional distress, but on... policy -considerations").
138. Id. at 664-65, 771 P.2d at 827-28, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
139. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
(mother able to recover for emotional trauma caused by witnessing the injury of her child due
to the acts of a negligent tortfeasor).
140. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
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(1) Limiting Dillon Without Abolishing It
The lower courts in California have had difficulty interpreting the
Dillon factors in such a way as to create a consistent body of case law on
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 41 This fact, however, is not
reason enough to draw a bright-line rule that goes against at least twenty
years of precedent, ignores the reasons for having a tort of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, and leaves a great number of deserving
plaintiffs without a cause of action.
With Dillon, the California Supreme Court was on the right track.
The Elden court should have expanded on the Dillon requirements ex-
plaining and refining further the factors so that the lower courts could
apply them more equitably. Though this was allegedly done in La
Chusa, the close relationship issue remains unchanged. As Justice
Broussard stated in his dissent in Elden, factfinders can evaluate the
closeness of relationships on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
liability for a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is war-
ranted. 42 The Elden court should have laid out guidelines by which the
lower courts and juries might evaluate the closeness of relationships.
For example, the court might have allowed a presumption of a
"close relationship" for immediate family members, significant others,
and persons who had lived in the plaintiff's household as a member of
the plaintiff's family for a specified period of time. If the defendant could
rebut this presumption, the burden of persuasion would shift to the plain-
tiff to prove "closely-related," and the issue would then be sent to the
jury. For other relationships, such as friends, neighbors, and more dis-
tant relatives, a set of factors could be established that would be applied
on a case-by-case basis and given to the trier of fact to decide the suffi-
ciency of the closeness of the relationship.
Although there will always be cases that present facts that do not fit
neatly into guidelines, it is the responsibility of the courts to deal with
these problems as they are encountered, not to set out arbitrary rules just
to make things easier.
(2) The Problem of Same-Sex Couples
The second possible reason for Elden's limitation on negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims may be that to have done otherwise
would have forced the court into an area where it is unwilling to go. If
the court had allowed unmarried cohabitants to recover for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, they presumably would have had to de-
velop criteria by which lower courts and juries could evaluate the
141. Id.
142. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 282-84, 758 P.2d 582, 592-93, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254,
264-65 (1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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"legitimacy" of the cohabitants' relationship. This analysis might take
into account such factors as the length of the relationship, the extent to
which the couple shares money and assets, and whether they have chil-
dren (by adoption or as biological parents). From the court's perspective
the possible problem with these factors is that they do not distinguish
between heterosexual and gay and lesbian unmarried cohabitants. This
situation would not only greatly increase the potential plaintiffs in negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress cases, but, more importantly, would
require the courts to recognize gay, lesbian, and unmarried heterosexual
couples as deserving of at least some of the same protections and advan-
tages as legally married couples. Although a just and equitable position,
this recognition would be a giant step that the California Supreme Court
apparently is not willing to take.
(3) "'Administrative and Socioeconomic" Factors
The third reason why the Elden court denied recovery may have to
do with the same "administrative and socioeconomic" factors cited in
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 143 The cost to society of award-
ing people what may be huge amounts of money for emotional distress
may be something that society is simply not willing to continue doing.
The resulting rise in insurance costs and the hindrance to economic
growth resulting from large jury verdicts in negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cases may outweigh the benefits to society of compensating
people for their emotional harm. The fears and rationales expressed in
Amaya 144 concerning recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress
are likely behind Elden's reasoning. 145 Indeed, those same reasons might
justify doing away with the tort of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress altogether, especially if the tort is retained in its present state, arbi-
trarily rewarding only a select group of plaintiffs.
Conclusion
In 1968, the California Supreme Court established a set of guidelines
in Dillon v. Legg that was to determine foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. The tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress in California has been in a state
of disarray because of different courts' widely-varying applications of the
Dillon guidelines. In Elden v. Sheldon and Thing v. La Chusa, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the inconsisten-
143. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 310-15, 379 P.2d 513, 522-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 42-45 (1963).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
145. This idea is supported by the fact that the court in La Chusa did, in fact, "return to
the concerns which prompted the Amaya court... to deny recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress." Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 664, 771 P.2d 814, 827, 257 Cal. Rptr.
865, 878 (1989).
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cies and inequities that have resulted because of the misapplication of
these guidelines.
Though the holding in La Chusa undoubtedly will help to resolve
some of the post-Dillon inconsistencies, it does nothing to rectify the un-
just result in Elden. The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
is supposed to compensate persons for the severe emotional pain they
suffer when they witness a loved one being injured by the negligent act of
another. Admittedly, there must be limits put on recovery in these types
of cases, but the policy considerations cited by Elden simply do not jus-
tify denying recovery to a person who fits all the requirements of the
paradigm case-with the sole exception being that they are neither mar-
ried nor related by blood to the victim.
This arbitrary line-drawing cannot be justified if we are to believe
that the purpose for having a tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress is to compensate mental suffering. It is the court's responsibility
to establish guidelines for recovery that attorneys, plaintiffs, courts, and
others can follow in determining liability in future cases. When those
parameters become illogically and unjustly built walls, as in Elden, we all
lose. The court fails in fulfilling its responsibilities, our faith in the
court's ability to be fair and just is scarred, and deserving plaintiffs are
denied a remedy for the injuries they suffer.
There is no just reason for denying recovery to unmarried cohabi-
tants and other truly "sufficiently close" relationships in negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress cases. The California Supreme Court, in Thing
v. La Chusa, while "refining" the Dillon factors, unfortunately failed to
formulate a law that reflects the realities of the society and rectify the
injustice created by the ruling of Elden v. Sheldon.
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